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Abstract10
11
Many characteristics typical of autism, a neurodevelopmental condition characterised by socio-12
communicative impairments, are most evident during social interaction. Accordingly, procedures13
such as the Autism Diagnosis Observation Schedule (ADOS) are interactive and intended to elicit14
interactional impairments: a diagnosis of autism is given if interactional difficulties are attributed15
as a persistent quality of the individual undergoing diagnosis. This task is difficult, first, because16
behaviours can be interpreted in various ways and, second, because conversation breakdown may17
indicate a disengagement with, or resistance to, a line of conversation. Drawing upon Conversation18
Analysis, we examine seven ADOS diagnosis sessions and ask how diagnosticians distinguish19
between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic indicator and, on the other, as a20
reasonable choice from a range of possible responses. We find evidence of various forms of21
resistance during ADOS sessions, but it is a resistance to a line of conversational action that is22
often determined to be indicative of autism. However, and as we show, this attribution of23
resistance can be ambiguous. We conclude by arguing for reflexive practice during any diagnosis24
where talk is the problem, and for a commitment to acknowledge the potential impact of diagnostic25
procedures themselves upon results.26
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Introduction37
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus in the academic literature on communication38
between those with autism, and those they interact with. Autism is defined as a39
neurodevelopmental disability characterised by ‘persistent deficits in social communication and40
social interaction,’ and ‘restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities’ (American41
Psychiatric Association 2013: 50). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this impairment in social42
communication skills which is seen to underpin a diagnosis of autism, a large proportion of the43
aforementioned literature has focused on identifying the ways in which the communication44
patterns of those with a diagnosis of autism differ from those who do not (e.g. Jones and Schwartz45
2009; Keen 2003, 2005; Bruinsma et al 2004). An inevitable consequence of this focus has been46
the development of a range of interaction-based interventions to try and enhance communication47
in this setting (e.g. Keen et al 2007; Schwartz et al 2004; Kasari et al 2006).48
More generally, and alongside these developments, there has been a growing call for a ‘sociology49
of diagnosis’ (Brown, 1995; Jutel 2009) which examines the way in which diagnostic labels50
representing particular conditions or patterns of behaviour come to be applied to individuals.51
3Critiquing early attempts at understanding diagnosis, Gill and Maynard (1995) have argued that52
social scientists were prone to evoke what they term ‘institutional determinism’. Institutional53
determinism represents a position wherein diagnosis is ‘…a straightforward naming activity, where54
labellers, who are largely naïve to the social and historical contexts in which they operate, decisively55
attach labels to acquiescent and similarly naïve individuals, and that is that’ (Gill & Maynard 1995:56
15). In this way, institutional determinism, which Gill and Maynard equate with labelling theory,57
posits at least two compliant parties in the diagnostic process. First, there are individuals receiving58
the diagnosis who are taken to be both passive and powerless to resist or shape the diagnostic59
process. Second, diagnosticians are assumed to be an institution’s willing executioners, completing60
the labelling process in a straightforward, unreflective manner.61
These assumptions of naivety and acquiescence have been challenged both theoretically and62
empirically. Theoretically, those who are often taken to be institutional determinists such as Michel63
Foucault (Beckett & Campbell 2015: 271) have argued that resistance, on a micro-sociological64
scale, is inherent to their work (e.g. Foucault 1997: 292). Empirically, a multiplicity of acts have65
been shown to stop or slow progress during everyday interactions: we sidestep unwanted66
invitations (Davidson 1984); fail to co-operate with requests we perceive as unreasonable by67
providing evidence of their unreasonable nature (Backhaus 2010; Heinemann 2006); or avoid68
committing to follow advice that we have not solicited or do not require (Heritage and Sefi 1992;69
Pilnick, 1999). There is ample evidence that resistance continues within institutional settings:70
parties approach a diagnosis with a range of quite different motives and expectations (Singh 2014)71
and may strongly resist outcomes which they perceive as either unexpected or undesired (Gill et72
al. 2010; Turowetz & Maynard 2016).73
The possibility of resistance to diagnosis does not, however, mean that producing such resistance74
is easy or straightforward. First, it has been argued that any form of engagement within a diagnostic75
arena necessitates the taking up of a particular form of subjectivity. While forms of resistance may76
4offer alternatives, therefore, this is still a form of ‘controlled autonomy’ (Callon & Rabeharisoa77
2002: 13) where engagement ensures that some possibilities arise while others are eliminated78
(Hacking 1995: 241; Hollin 2017: 617). Second, acts of resistance may be co-opted by those being79
resisted. So, for example, it has been argued that self-advocacy and the social model of disability,80
which may be articulated as forms of resistance to the medical model, have been incorporated into81
governmental policy and diluted or used to support existing positions (Armstrong 2002; Aspis82
1997; Buchanan & Walmsley 2006). Third, resistance may be kept off the ‘public balance sheet’.83
Hoffman et al. (2015), for example, note that participants in Stanley Milgram’s studies on84
obedience to authority consistently resisted calls to obey but that these acts were excluded from85
published reports. Acts which unsettle diagnostic practices in situ may, therefore, ultimately be86
disregarded. Fourth, and most pertinent to this paper, there may be instances where acts of87
resistance are themselves interpreted as evidence of clinical pathology. This final point is, we88
suggest, most likely to be relevant to ‘medical problems where talk is the problem’ (Garcia 2012),89
such as autism.90
Interactional resistance and autism91
As we noted at the outset, core symptom clusters in autism manifest themselves most clearly92
during interaction and conversation. Diagnostic procedures such as the Autism Diagnosis93
Observation Schedule (ADOS: Lord et al. 1989), which we will consider in more detail in the94
following section, often involve structured interaction and are intended to elicit such symptoms.95
A diagnosis of autism is given if interactional difficulties, which diagnosticians are attempting to96
elicit, are attributed as a persistent quality of the individual undergoing diagnosis1. However, and97
1 This premise has been critiqued by self-advocates and those working within disability studies. Milton, for example,
argues that ‘symptoms’ should not be understood as residing within an individual but, rather, should be construed as
socially situated. Milton refers to this as the ‘double empathy’ problem; two individuals occupying different ‘lifeworlds’
(i.e. ‘autistic’ and ‘neurotypical’ lifeworlds) struggle to comprehend each other and, while communication breakdown
ensues, neither individual should be understood as impaired (Milton 2012). Such a conclusion is both plausible and
valuable but, for present purposes, can be offset in favour of the question of persistence. Any diagnosis of autism, as
either difference or deficit, is premised upon persistent qualities of interaction rather than any temporary breakdown. It
is this distinction which primarily concerns us here.
5as others have noted (Turowetz 2015a), interactional difficulty during diagnosis could be located98
in various other sites which would not presume pathology. Breakdown could, for example, result99
from the specific interactions between the individual undergoing diagnosis, the diagnostician, and100
the diagnostic instrument itself. Diagnosticians must, therefore, determine if social or interactional101
difficulties are specific to this moment, interaction, and setting, or if difficulties are a permanent102
quality of the diagnosed individual’s conversations.103
This task is made harder for, as several studies have shown, behaviours exhibited during autism104
diagnosis are frequently underdetermined and can be interpreted in various ways (Muskett et al.105
2010; Turowetz 2015b). Turowetz, for example, discusses the example of a child named Tony106
who, during diagnosis, attempted to drink from a picture of a cup. Tony’s actions could variously107
be interpreted as an example of a confusion between image and reality or as an example of pretend108
play (Turowetz 2015b: 72-73). The former reading may be indicative of autism while the second,109
to some schools of thought at least (Hollin 2014: 105), may actually preclude a diagnosis.110
Interpretation is, thus, in all likelihood a permanent and important feature of autism diagnosis.111
When attributing behaviours during autism diagnosis, Turowetz has elsewhere reported that:112
‘...clinicians’ representations typically attribute responsibility for successes and failures to113
the child’s personal qualities and characteristics, abstracting from the surrounding114
environment’ (Turowetz 2015a: 221).115
Clinicians, thus, typically understand behaviours as evidence of fixed traits, rather than responses116
to the specific environment. Such an attribution is evidently multifaceted, but it becomes even117
more complex where the interactional behaviour in question is not one that is specific to a118
diagnosis of autism, but is also found universally. A refusal to make eye contact, for example, may119
be evidence of autism but it may also indicate a disengagement with, or resistance to, a topic of120
conversation (Argyle & Dean 1965).121
6In this paper, we focus on the production of interactional resistance during the actual process of122
testing for diagnosis. As we have described above, resistance to the ultimately proferred diagnosis,123
or to the visible building towards such a diagnosis (see Gill et al 2010), is a previously observed124
feature of healthcare interactions, and is generally treated as an understandable response to125
unexpected or unwelcome news. Furthermore, previous conversation analytic work begins to126
identify the range of interactional forms resistance may take. It may be expressed directly, as in the127
case of the parents explicitly resisting a label of intellectual disabilities for their child (Gill and128
Maynard 1995), or it may be more indirect or passive, as Heritage and Sefi demonstrate in response129
to unsolicited advice from Health Visitors and as Stivers (2007) identifies in relation to parents’130
treatment of doctors’ refusal to prescribe desired antibiotics to their children because of a viral131
diagnosis. The question that guides our analysis here is: how, in the case of autism, do132
diagnosticians distinguish between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic133
indicator and, on the other, as a relevant and reasonable choice from a range of possible responses?134
Put simply, how is it to be judged whether resistance in this setting is to be considered ‘mundane’135
or ‘autistic’?136
It is important to note here that it is not our contention that autism is purely a social construction137
(see similar arguments made in relation to intellectual disability, e.g. Rapley (2004)). We do not138
advocate for institutional determinism, deny the reality of individuals’ difficulties with social139
interaction, seek to undermine the judgement and effort made by diagnosticians or the fact that a140
diagnosis can provide individuals and families with much needed access to support and resources.141
Our focus is purely on a specific empirical problem which must be resolved interactionally: by142
what criteria can everyday interactional practices be distinguished from diagnostic indicators? It is143
also important to note that we seek to assign no blame, or pass any judgement, on the professionals144
whose interactions are presented here. We simply seek to shed light on the different ways resistance145
may manifest itself in these interactions, and the practical problem of categorisation that then146
7arises. In order to unpack this, we focus on the actual delivery of the ADOS test and how it is147
assessed in the moment, through interactional interpretative work.148
The ADOS test149
Diagnostic scoring and rating instruments are commonly used across a wide range of medical150
specialties, from the APGAR scores applied to newborn infants to the Mini Mental State151
Examination (MMSE) used in the diagnosis of dementia. By their nature, such instruments pre-152
define specific issues or behaviours as significant. However, as Turowetz has noted, the153
contribution of these instruments to the production of diagnostic ‘facts’ is generally minimized;154
they are ‘treated as neutral, autonomous tools of measurement that record data for assessment,155
rather than contributing to such data’ (Turowetz 2015a: 215). The end product of this156
minimization is the production of test results as though the presenter ‘acted in a kind of157
interactional vacuum’. Such decontextualisation is necessary to maintain the impression of the158
objectivity of testing. However, as others have ably demonstrated, both within healthcare settings159
and beyond, what Maynard and Marlaire (1992) call ‘the interactional substrate of testing’ can have160
a marked impact on the results that are obtained from it (Antaki, 2001; Maynard and Schaeffer161
2002).162
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) was first developed in 1989 (Lord et al.163
1989), intended for use within both research and clinical settings (Lord et al. 1989: 186), and for164
those with a verbal age greater than three (Lord et al. 1989: 208). Subsequently, and with the intent165
of facilitating clinical evaluation in a wider range of individuals, the ‘ADOS-generic’ (ADOS-G)166
was developed in 2000 (Lord et al. 2000). This new version of the ADOS has four sub-versions167
ranging from a ‘module 1’ version intended for preverbal individuals through to a ‘module 4’168
version intended for adolescents and adults with fluent speech.169
In all its forms the ADOS is:170
8‘...an interactive schedule. What is standardized in the ADOS are the contexts that provide171
the background for all observations and, more specifically, the behaviors of the examiner...’172
(Lord et al. 1989: 187, italics in original)173
In the social psychological tradition, therefore, the highly trained practitioners giving the ADOS174
are understood as stooges or confederates (Lord et al. 1989: 187), standardising activities and their175
own behaviours in order to prompt a number of ‘social occasions’ within which ‘a range of social176
initiations and responses is likely to appear’ (Lord et al. 2000: 205). These invitations are referred177
to as ‘presses’. Presses on module 4 for the ADOS include: engaging in conversation about a range178
of ‘socioemotional’ issues (e.g. friends, loneliness, social difficulties) and everyday functioning179
(school/work); a construction task (akin to making a simple jigsaw); telling a story from a picture180
book; physical demonstration of an everyday task (e.g. brushing of teeth); creating a story with the181
use of physical objects (including, in our sample, a toy car, a sponge, and a cocktail umbrella); the182
retelling of a cartoon strip; free play with toys; and description of a picture featuring a social scene.183
Throughout these activities the investigator searches for the social and communicative atypicalities184
associated with autism. While accounting for the possibility of resistance during these activities185
does not appear to have been a priority to the creators of the ADOS, measures were put in place186
to address expected ambiguities. The 0-3 rating scales described below are intended to allow ‘room187
for uncertainty’ (Lord et al. 1989: 190) while trained diagnosticians need to ‘judge whether factors188
extraneous to the social demands of the ADOS-G [including ‘cultural context’] may have189
influenced the assessment’ (Lord et al. 2000: 222) when making their decisions.190
Following the ADOS sessions, which are video recorded, examiners watch back the video –191
sometimes though not always with a colleague – and score participants’ behaviour across a range192
of domains. In some areas the scoring criteria frame this as a quantitative exercise; ‘imagination193
and creativity’, for example, is scored from 0 (several instances where imagination is demonstrated)194
to 3 (no instances where imagination is demonstrated). In other areas, examiners are required to195
9make a more explicitly qualitative assessment; ‘overall rapport’ for example is ranked between a196
‘comfortable’ 0 and an ‘uncomfortable’ 3. Upon conclusion, participant scores are added and a197
diagnosis of ‘autism’ is given for particularly high scorers, ‘autism spectrum’ for those scoring198
reasonably highly, or ‘non-spectrum’ for low scorers. While the ADOS has well recognised clinical199
limitations which prevent its use in isolation – for example, it was designed neither to examine age200
of onset or the presence of restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs), although201
some insight into the latter is intended – it has high levels of reliability and validity and has become202
widely established as a ‘gold standard’ diagnostic instrument for autism (Fombonne 2009: 592;203
Norbury & Sparks 2013: 7)204
The current sample205
The current study examines 7 ADOS sessions, all of which were conducted using the ‘module 4’206
version of the test (Lord et al. 2000). The individuals undertaking the ADOS were all men and207
aged from late teens to mid-twenties. All had pre-existing diagnoses of either Asperger’s Syndrome208
or autism and, on the basis of these diagnoses, had been invited to take part in a university-based209
research study for which it was necessary that a further ADOS be completed. In every case a210
diagnosis of autism or autism spectrum was confirmed. The two examiners conducting the ADOS211
were both female postgraduate students in their twenties and had been fully trained and qualified212
to administer the procedure (Lord et al 2002). Although only one examiner acted as ‘stooge’ in any213
given session both were involved in the rating of all participants.214
In the light of the above information it should be noted that there is a particular dynamic within215
this sample. Both participants and examiners already knew that an independent diagnosis of216
autism/autism spectrum had been arrived at previously and there were no clinical consequences217
following the current sitting (i.e. existing diagnoses could not be questioned). Such uses of the218
ADOS are intended (Lord et al. 1989: 186) but, as we stress in the analysis and discussion,219
generalisations to other contexts should be made with caution.220
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ADOS sessions took place in either the participant’s educational setting or at the researchers’221
university and lasted between 35 and 52 minutes2. As is typical (see above) these sessions were222
recorded in order to facilitate scoring and it is these videos – and the note and scoring sheets made223
by the examiners – which are utilized in the present study. The note sheets were taken by the224
examiners either during the ADOS sessions or immediately afterwards. The score sheets contain225
not only the final diagnostic judgements but also the ‘working out’ of these scores (so for example226
noting how many and where instances of ‘demonstration of imagination’ occurred in order to227
assign a number from the scale). These written documents therefore provided a significant insight228
into the diagnostic production process. The present study received ethical approval following229
University ethical review procedures and all participants gave written permission for their data to230
be reused for this piece.231
Methods232
The video-recorded ADOS sessions were fully transcribed using CLAN software, and analysed233
using conversation analysis (CA). CA is a research method that originates in sociology but draws234
on insights from other disciplines such as psychology and linguistics (see ten Have, 2007). Its aim235
is to study the structure and order of naturally occurring talk in interactions. The method has been236
widely used to study a broad range of healthcare interactions (e.g. Pilnick et al, ) as well as the237
administration of testing instruments where communicative or intellectual competency is238
potentially an issue (e.g. Antaki (2001), Rapley (2004)). Given the importance of the use of objects239
for administering the ADOS, it was important also to consider non-verbal and paralinguistic240
features of the interactions; these were noted alongside the transcriptions. Transcripts were used241
alongside the original recordings as an analytic aide. The original notes and scoring documents242
used by the ADOS examiners were analysed alongside the video recordings. Since notes often243
2 One recording failed part way through the session and, thus, only the first portion of this ADOS is considered
here.
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refer to the specific interactional instances that have occasioned them (e.g. the interviewer244
recording what has been taken to be an example of a particular phenomenon), this meant that, as245
far as possible, we could analyse the talk alongside the coding categories that had been assigned to246
it.247
Analysis248
Our analysis identifies three different kinds of resistance in our data, which will be considered in249
turn: resistance to a proposed task; resistance to a behaviour or feeling being characterised in a250
particular way; and resistance to a proposed line of conversational action.251
1) Resistance to a proposed task.252
In our data, this kind of resistance is produced in response to requests to participate in specific253
components of the test, for example a request to act out an action, and a rationale is usually254
provided for the refusal (e.g. ‘not with him watching’). In everyday interaction, resistance to comply255
with requests is dispreferred, with CA research repeatedly demonstrating that human interaction256
is organized to favour actions promoting social affiliation (Pillet-Shore forthcoming; Pomerantz257
and Heritage 2012; Kitzinger and Frith 1999). As a result, a refusal is usually produced with an258
account or a mitigation; where it is not, it may be seen as accountable by the requesting party259
(particularly where the request is produced with a high degree of entitlement and a lack of260
contingency (Curl and Drew 2008)) and so be pursued by the requestor. This pursuit commonly261
takes the form of reframing. Reframing generally treats the resistance as either a lack of262
understanding (so the requestor goes on to describe it differently) or a lack of ability (e.g. that263
someone can’t reach something they’ve been asked to pass). It is not generally treated by the co-264
participant as a lack of willingness. However, lack of willingness is sometimes specifically265
demonstrated in these data, as the example below illustrates (INV = interviewer/assessor, PAR=266
participant, OBV = observer, often a parent):267
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Extract 1: A13268
581 *INV:next thi:ng (0.9) this one you might feel a bit silly doing it269
582 *INV:m(h)hm (.) but (.) can you imagine (.) that (.) i::'m just a::270
583 *INV:erm (.) we:ll (.) i'm a small child and i don't know how to:271
584 *INV:make a cup of tea (.) can you: show and tell me272
585 *INV:how to make a cup of tea (.) if say the kettle is he:re273
586 *INV:the mug's he:re (.) tea bag is here (.) can you (.) show and tell me?274
587 (3.7)275
588 *PAR:.hhh::: (.) no (.) no i ⌈can't⌉276
589 *INV: ⌊no ⌋ (.) why's that?277
590 *PAR:'cos i can't imagine you to be a ch(h)ild278
591 *INV:o:r what about (.) erm (.) can you just do it without imagining279
592 *INV:that i'm a ⌈child ⌉280
593 *PAR: ⌊no (.)⌋ i - (.) no:281
594 *INV:no (.) could try a different one?282
595 *PAR:he's watching me (.) i can't do it .(h)hhh283
596 PAR indicates camera284
285
In this extract, the interviewer introduces a new component of the ADOS test, that of acting out286
an everyday action. However, she prefaces her description with an acknowledgement that the287
request which will follow is potentially problematic, and may make the participant ‘feel a bit silly’288
(line 581). While the interactionally preferred response to a request is acceptance or compliance,289
this request, then, is designed in such a way as to make refusal easier; itself a demonstration that290
diagnosticians are far from being the cultural dopes assumed within institutional determinism. The291
extended pause at line 587 signals that straightforward acceptance is unlikely to follow (Pomerantz292
1984; Clayman 2002), and the participant does indeed refuse in line 588. This refusal (‘no (.) no (.)293
I can’t’) does not make explicit the reason behind it, and this is pursued in line 590, prompting the294
production of a specific difficulty with this specific request by the participant: that he cannot295
13
imagine the researcher as a child. At this point the possibility remains that the participant’s296
unwillingness is linked to this specific manifestation of the activity, rather than the activity itself,297
and the interviewer first attempts to clarify over lines 591-592 whether a modified version of this298
specific activity can be attempted which does not require the imaginative leap. When this is also299
refused, the interviewer produces a more general request to try any activity in this category (‘could300
try a different one?’ in line 594). At line 595 it becomes clear that the participant’s refusal indexes301
unwillingness rather than ability; he is not prepared to engage in an activity of this kind with the302
camera ‘watching’.303
Extract 2 below shows a further example of resistance to a proposed task, when the interviewer304
invites the participant to tell a story using the objects on the table; in this instance these include305
small toys such as a car and a ball, and small household items such as a shoelace and a cocktail306
umbrella. Immediately prior to this extract, the interviewer has explained the task by telling a short307
story using these objects herself.308
Extract 2: A14 (51:15).309
1580:*INV: and (.) your story doesn't have to be as sad as mine310
1581:*INV: but if you wanna pick (.) five items that aren't the five I picked311
1582:*INV: so out of here ((indicates plastic bag containing items))312
1583:*PAR: I'd prefer not to do it ((shakes head vigorously))313
1584:*INV: you'd prefer not to do it that's absolutely fine314
1585:*INV: ⌈no problem ⌉315
1586:*PAR: ⌊it's just a ⌋ bit erm316
1587: (2.0)317
1588:*PAR: just a bit baby⌈ish ⌉318
1589:*INV: ⌊a bit⌋ - that's fine319
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1560:*PAR: ⌈no offence⌉320
1561:*INV: ⌊we try and ⌋ ge- no that's fine (.) we try and get everyone321
1562:*INV: to do them regardless of how old they are but if you don't322
1563:*INV: want to do it that's no worries at all323
1564: (0.8)324
325
This extract begins with the interviewer requesting that the participant select his own five objects326
from the bag (lines 1580-582). In contrast to extract 1 above, the refusal that occurs here is327
immediate, and it also embeds an account for the refusal which demonstrates lack of willingness328
(‘I’d prefer not to do it’). Despite the interviewer’s lack of pursuit (she immediately accepts the329
refusal in line 1584), the participant subsequently expands the account to indicate that the lack of330
willingness is because the activity is ‘babyish’; an apology for this (line 1560) is also used to mitigate331
the refusal. Following the interviewer’s response in lines 1561-63 which reiterates acceptance of332
the refusal, the topic is closed and the interviewer subsequently moves to end the ADOS session333
(not shown here).334
Examination of the records made by the ADOS testers shows that in neither of the examples335
shown above were the participant responses treated as noteworthy in diagnostic terms. This is also336
the case for other examples of this type in these data; that this kind of resistance to a proposed337
task is treated as ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ resistance. One explanation for this might be linked to the338
argument that Stokoe (2013) makes in relation to the use of role play more generally: that the339
‘stakes’ in role playing activities may be treated differently (and less seriously) by participants. The340
knowledge that this is a research rather than clinical setting may also impact on this, and a refusal341
to participate in a ‘babyish’ diagnostic activity may be less straightforwardly accepted in a clinical342
context. In relation to these specific data, however, we note that these refusals show clear343
orientation to the ‘ordinary’ rules of interaction; they show delay and/or mitigation and accounting344
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for the refusal. This is in contrast with other settings where overt refusals are commonly made345
without this orientation, such as the interactions of people with dementia (O’Brien et al 2016), and346
where this phenomenon tends to be interpreted as part and parcel of the underlying condition. It347
appears that what the kind of resistance displayed here does, perhaps paradoxically, is to enable348
participants to demonstrate interactional competency. We will now turn to examine the second349
category of resistance emerging from these data.350
2.) Resistance to a behaviour or a feeling being characterised in a particular way351
The extract below comes from the ‘socioemotional’ section of the ADOS where the interviewer352
asks about emotions and feelings. Having asked about feeling annoyed or angry, she moves to ask353
about sadness:354
Extract 3: A13355
703: *INV: do you do things if you're feeling kind of sa:d to ma-356
704: *INV: to s- to ma- help you feel better ?357
705: (1.0)358
706: *PAR: well if I'm feeling sad I'd probably like put some music on359
707: *INV: mhm360
708: *PAR: blank out the world a bit361
709: (1.6)362
710: *PAR: throw on a game363
711: *INV: yeah364
712:*PAR: if that doesn't do it watch a funny video365
713:*INV: does that help ⌈you -⌉366
714:*PAR: ⌊watch⌋ a mo⌈vie ⌉367
715:*INV: ⌊yea:h⌋368
716:*INV: so relax and ⌈things⌉369
717: *PAR: ⌊go to ⌋ bed370
718:: (1.1)371
719:*PAR: it's pretty (.) normal things to do I think372
16
373
The interviewer’s initial question here asks the participant about how they might manage their374
feelings of sadness. In response the participant produces first a single item, and then, in the face375
of minimal acknowledgements or silence from the interviewer, continues with the production of376
a list of potential activities. At line 713 the interviewer produces a more extended response, and377
then in 716 a summary of the list which functions as an upshot statement (Robinson 2006), ‘So378
relax and things’. The participant’s utterance in line 717 appears to be responsive to the379
interviewer’s use of the word ‘relax’, so that the final item he produces is ‘go to bed’ in 718. At line380
719 he then produces his own kind of upshot statement, which serves a rather different function381
than the interviewer’s. Rather than providing a category for the kind of activities which references382
their nature, he instead provides a category which references the way they are to be interpreted:383
‘normal’. As Sacks (1984) asserts, ‘doing being ordinary’ takes work and effort, and in order to384
achieve this it is necessary to have knowledge of what everybody does ordinarily. The participant’s385
response thus references this knowledge and uses it to resist categorisation as ‘abnormal’ or386
‘autistic’.387
It is worth noting here that this kind of resistance may be particularly associated with the specific388
characteristics of this population: adolescents or young adults who have previous experience of389
use of the ADOS as a diagnostic tool. We suggest that this resistance to an ‘abnormal’390
characterisation is not likely to occur in ADOS interactions with younger children, who would be391
unlikely to have this level of understanding of the process; in addition, the use of this type of392
resistance also suggests a level of insight into the way in which diagnostic tests such as the ADOS393
work. This observation feeds in to wider issues around adolescents’ participation in health care394
encounters, where taken for granted assumptions about ‘normal adolescence’ may be used to395
justify and normalise behaviours which might otherwise be seen as accountable (Allen, 2013).396
Interestingly, the body of literature examining interactions between health care professionals and397
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adolescents also suggests that adolescents’ lack of ability to envisage or understand long term398
effects of behaviour can be consequential; Karnielei-Miller and Eiskivits (2009) use this399
phenomenon as a justification for arguing that more directive styles of interaction may therefore400
be appropriate. However, in this instance, the long term effect of presenting something which is401
seen as an ‘abnormal’ or ‘accountable’ way of dealing with feelings of sadness is both anticipated402
and set aside by this young man’s response.403
In the second example of this type shown here, the interviewer has just concluded the telling of404
her story using the everyday objects that are available (this process is detailed in the discussion of405
extract 2). Before she began, she informed the participant that after she had completed her story,406
she would ask him to tell one. At the conclusion of her story there is shared laughter, before she407
invites the participant to begin by way of referring to the quality of her own story:408
Extract 4: A28409
1128 *INV:⌈(laughs)⌉410
1129 *PAR:⌊(laughs)⌋411
1130 *INV:erm412
1131 (1.5)413
1132 *INV:as you can tell it doesn't have to be a great work of fiction .(h)hh414
1133 *INV:.(h)hhh415
1134 *PAR:all the things that I'm bad at you're asking m(h)e to d⌈(h)o (h)ha⌉416
1135 *INV: ⌊(laughs) ⌋417
1136 *PAR:which I guess is the point418
1137 (0.8)419
1138 *PAR:erm (.) okay420
421
Following the interviewer’s self-deprecating assessment in line 1132, the participant’s response is422
not, however, to immediately begin the story. Instead he offers initial resistance (1134), produced423
as humorous, and interviewer aligns with the humour. However, his continuation in 1136 orients424
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to a wider understanding of the activity- that the specific purpose of the ADOS tasks are to elicit425
areas where he may have difficulties. The interviewer does not produce a response to this, and426
after a short pause (line 1137) the participant does embark on the telling of a story. In this case427
then the resistance is more subtle than in Extract 3, and is only temporary.428
In both of the extracts shown here, the resistance which is displayed moves beyond the interaction.429
In so doing, it orients to the fact that this is not simply a conversation where regular conversational430
actions have to be attended to (responding to a question, listening to a story etc) but also one431
where both the quality and content of these actions are being assessed through a particular432
framework. As with the first type of resistance identified above, in our data this type of resistance433
is likely to be treated as a reasonable, ‘normal’ response. In neither of the examples above do434
testers score this resistance as problematic.435
We now turn to examine our third category of resistance: resistance to a line of conversational436
action. As analysis will show, this category is both more complex and more consequential than437
those considered previously.438
3.) Resistance to a line of conversational action439
As we have already described, those administering the ADOS attempt to prompt a number of440
‘social occasions’ within which ‘a range of social initiations and responses is likely to appear’ (Lord441
et al. 2000: 205). Practically, this may include the interviewer telling their own story which relates442
to a topic raised by the respondent, sharing their own fears when a participant has described443
something they are afraid of, or offering their own experience of an event or happening when a444
participant has shared theirs. All of these ‘social occasions’ also potentially occur within mundane445
conversation, where an individual has the ability to align or otherwise, and where a lack of446
alignment may potentially be treated as accountable (see for example Jefferson’s (1988) work on447
troubles telling and the requirement for one party to align as a ‘troubles-recipient’ for the activity448
to continue). There are a number of examples in our data where participants in the ADOS do not449
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align in this way. Extract 5 begins following a discussion of things that make the participant450
anxious:451
Extract 5: A12 (18:30)452
619:*INV: yeah hey (.) that's really good that you're working to it453
620:*INV: I'm only just starting to work on my anxieties as well454
621:*INV: I had something really bad happen to me455
622: (4.2)456
623:*INV: so (.) I was (.) cycling into work (.) and a car457
624:*INV: came at me (.) like this to the side458
625:*PAR: ⌈.hhh ⌉459
626:*INV: ⌊and I went⌋ into the tram tracks and fell over460
627:*INV: and I got really really (.) scared cycling for a while461
628:*INV: but (.) I had to be you know (.) had to be strong462
629:*INV: and now I'm cycling into work again and I'm just (.) i -463
630:*INV: I act safer on the road now464
631:*PAR: ⌈mmm ⌉465
632:*INV: ⌊like⌋ instead of me going into the side of the road466
633:*INV: I take the whole road like a car467
634:*OBS: ⌈ (laughs) ⌉468
635:*INV: ⌊much better plan⌋469
636: (1.0)470
637:*INV: alright471
After acknowledging the participant’s discussion of anxiety in the preceding section (not shown472
here) the interviewer begins, at line 620, to tell a story relating to her own anxiety. In line 621 this473
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is concretised into a ‘really bad experience’. There is a significant pause but the participant does474
not align here either as a recipient of the story, or of the expressed trouble. Instead, the interviewer475
continues with the specifics of this story- a cycling accident- over lines 623-35. While the476
participant does offer some minimal acknowledgements/continuation markers (lines 625 and 631),477
and the video shows some eye contact, he does not acknowledge or respond to the completion of478
the story in line 636. Instead, following the pause, the interviewer moves to a different topic. This479
resistance to assuming the role of story or troubles recipient is noted by the assessors, and scored480
as indicative of autism.481
An example of a similar phenomenon can be found in Extract 6 below. In this extract the prior482
discussion has been about work and careers:483
Extract 6: A16 (13:20)484
370:*INV: but I'm guessing - (.) have you got one of those integrated485
371:*INV: masters ⌈things yeah (.) er::m⌉486
372:*PAR: ⌊yeah (.) it's a undergrad masters⌋487
373:*INV: undergrad masters yeah yeah that's what (.) my fiance did488
374:INV: but he didn't do it in physics489
375: (3.4)490
376:INV: cool (.) okay491
377: (1.2)492
493
In this instance, the interviewer already knows that the respondent is a physics graduate, and they494
have been talking about a third party who has recently completed their Masters degree. The495
interviewer makes a proposal as to the kind of qualification in physics the respondent has, which496
he affirms in line 372. The interviewer responds by relating that this is the same qualification as497
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her fiancé has, but stating that ‘he didn’t do it in physics’. There is a lengthy pause, during which498
there is eye contact and a small head movement in acknowledgement by the participant. However,499
no verbal response is produced to either acknowledge the story or to seek further details. Again,500
this failure to respond is categorised as problematic, with the notes identifying a failure to follow501
up the interactional ‘press’.502
These kinds of ‘presses’ are included in the ADOS precisely because a failure to respond503
appropriately to them is seen as characteristic of autism. An inability to engage in social504
communication and a lack of awareness of another’s feelings or emotions are diagnostic criteria of505
autism, and so the failure to respond to presses like these is taken as the interactional manifestation506
of autism. The diagnostic importance of these instances for the ADOS means that it is critical that507
they can be accurately and appropriately identified. However, given the messiness of talk-in-508
interaction in general, we suggest that this task may be more challenging than is generally509
acknowledged. Extract 7 below shows another example of a ‘press’ which is not responded to,510
which we argue is much more ambiguous than the two we have seen so far:511
Extract 7: A10 (15:00)512
488 *INV: do you like rollercoasters and - and fairs and -513
489 *PAR: I don't like big rollercoasters514
490 *INV: yeah515
491 *PAR: yeah (.) I know it seems a little bit silly but516
492 *PAR: I only like the little roller⌈coasters⌉517
493 *INV: ⌊yeah ⌋518
494 *PAR: the little kiddy ones519
495 *INV: do you feel scared on the big ones520
496 *PPP: (1.3)521
497 *PAR: I (.) haven't even been on one yet522
498 *INV: okay ⌈does the thought⌉523
499 *PAR: ⌊⁇xxx⁇ ⁇xxx⁇ ⌋524
500 *INV: of it525
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501 *PAR: yeah526
502 *INV: ⌈yeah ⌉527
503 *PAR: ⌊the thought⌋ of it s- scared me528
504 *INV: yeah (.) me too (.) can you describe that feeling529
505 (2.1)530
506 *PAR: I-531
507 (1.1)532
508 *PAR: (h) (h) (h)it's scaring me even thinking ⌈of one ⌉533
509 *INV: ⌊oh really⌋534
510 *INV: okay we'll move on ye- I don't like them either535
511 *INV: I used to like them but then last year I went on one and since then536
512 (4.5)537
513 *INV: okay (.) er::m (.) so::538
514 *INV: so you're at college at the moment539
540
In this extract, the interviewer and participant are talking about rollercoasters, prompted by the541
participant having revealed that he is about to make a trip to Blackpool, an English town with a542
famous funfair (talk not shown here). The interviewer attempts to use this topic to discuss the543
feeling of being scared (line 504), but the participant resists this, initially delaying and eventually544
explicitly producing an account that even thinking about this is scary (line 508). At line 510 the545
interviewer acknowledges this by producing a topic closure indicative statement- ‘we’ll move on’ -546
before immediately embarking on a story about her own trip on a rollercoaster last year. There is547
a lengthy pause, before the interviewer does move to a new topic at 513.548
The notes suggest that this introduction of the interviewer’s story about a rollercoaster was549
intended as a press, and the lack of response is rated by one of the two scorers as problematic for550
that reason. However, we would argue that a judgement about whether this instance is to be551
considered consequential is very delicate, and complicated by the fact that there is an arguably552
mixed message sent by the tester. The participant’s response could be read as a lack of orientation553
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to the story, and a resistance to occupying the role of story recipient. Equally, however, it could554
be read as a competent orientation to the signalled closing of a topic; the ‘we’ll move on’ produced555
by the interviewer in line 510. Another ambiguity is introduced by the fact that the interviewer’s556
turn to continue the topic in line 511 is grammatically incomplete, so the participant could simply557
be waiting for the completion of this utterance. The fact that only one of the two scorers scores it558
as problematic highlights these ambiguities.559
This kind of ambiguity over how an utterance’s appropriateness is to be interpreted is evident in560
other locations in our data, demonstrating how much the actions of the tester contribute to the561
‘interactional substrate’ of the ADOS. The example below is taken from earlier in session A10.562
Extract 8: A10 (10:07)563
329 *INV: yea::h (.) did you go swimming564
330 *PAR: yeah565
331 *INV: did you like it566
332 *PAR: yeah567
333 (1.5)568
334 *INV: I used to like swimming in the sea but I don't like it anymore569
335 (1.0)570
336 *PAR: yeah571
337 (1.0)572
338 *PAR: ⁇one of my⁇ (.) dogs is terrified of sand573
574
In this instance, the topic of conversation is holidays; having established that the participant went575
swimming on their recent holiday (329-30), and that they enjoyed it, (331-32) the interviewer then576
offers the beginning of a story or trouble in line 334. There is a minimal acknowledgement of this577
from the participant before he then begins to talk on a different topic in line 338. This exchange578
is scored by both scorers as a failure to respond to the press, indicative of autism. However, we579
would argue that just as there is ambiguity in Extract 8 above over whether the respondent is580
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actually orienting to a different interactional contingency, there is also potential ambiguity here. In581
ordinary interaction, participants may sometimes respond to a story by producing a story of their582
own, rather than by continuing to inhabit the role of story recipient. Second stories are generally583
built to show that they are picking up the point of the previous story, or are “touched off” by them584
(Sacks 1992: 771). In this instance, then, it is possible that the participant’s response in line 338,585
which continues with the broad theme of anxiety at the seaside, is designed as a relevant586
contribution in this way.587
Analysing the scoring notes alongside the three categories of resistance we have identified in these588
data shows that it is this third category of resistance, resistance to a line of conversational action,589
that is the most consequential in terms of its likely diagnostic implications. It appears, however,590
that this is also the most interactionally complex category, so that the potential for ambiguity of591
interpretation is greater. We argue that this ambiguity is related to the fact that any resistance592
displayed in response to an ADOS interactional ‘press’ is inherently likely to be much more indirect593
than that displayed in response to a request for action, or as a pre-emptive strike against594
categorisation. Direct requests, for example, fit an adjacency pair format and conditional relevance595
of the response is a normative requirement, so that pursuit of a request is both expected and596
accepted where a relevant response does not occur. A failure to align as a troubles recipient in597
response to someone else’s expressed difficulties is both less straightforwardly accountable and598
more likely to be done indirectly.599
Previous CA work suggests that one way in which resistance may be indirectly expressed in600
healthcare is by clients withholding a response to an expressed perspective (Heritage and Sefi 2002,601
Stivers 2007), but such withholding in these contexts is not necessarily treated as accountable or602
pursued. ADOS examiners, then, are required to make two sets of incredibly complex interactional603
judgements as part of their categorisation process: firstly whether what they have observed is604
indicative of resistance (in the sense that it acts to stop the progress of an interactional trajectory);605
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and second whether that resistance is significant for the diagnostic process. Given the complexities606
involved, it is no surprise that this is not always a clear-cut judgement. As our examples above607
have shown, in some cases where resistance is categorised there are other, plausible interpretations;608
these would in fact display different kinds of ‘normal’ interactional competencies on the part of609
the participants.610
Discussion611
Our analysis of ADOS examinations has noted several prominent features of diagnostic612
interactions. First, neither participant nor diagnostician is ‘institutionally determined’ (Gill &613
Maynard 1995: 15); both parties behave reflexively and in response to the local particularities of the614
interaction. In the case of participants, these situated responses include a range of resistances to615
the ‘substrate of the testing’ (Maynard and Marlaire 1992) including the filming of sessions, tests616
that are perceived to be ‘too babyish’, and the conversational actions of the examiner.617
Given that autism is a condition ‘where talk is the problem’ (Garcia 2012) these resistances to618
conversational flow pose a particular problem for diagnosticians. We have shown that testers are619
engaged in constant judgments about the kinds of resistance they are experiencing, determining620
which kinds of resistance are to be considered consequential for diagnosis. Our findings621
demonstrate that not all kinds of resistance are considered equal in the ADOS. Resisting a622
proposed task as inappropriate, or resisting the characterisation of a particular behaviour as623
‘autistic’, is likely to pass unremarked. Resistance to a line of conversational action – a failure to624
respond appropriately to a conversational ‘press’ from an examiner – is, however, often625
determined to be consequential and indicative of autism. This is despite the fact that firstly, similar626
forms of resistance can be evident and deemed purposive in other healthcare settings (Gill &627
Maynard 1995; Stivers 2007) and, secondly, they can be difficult to identify with absolute clarity628
given the degree of interpretation that is required.629
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It is however important to note that our sample is both small and particular. Participants were630
intellectually able and demonstrated a degree of insight that may not be common across the631
population with whom the ADOS is used. Participants also had a pre-existing diagnosis of632
autism/autism spectrum and no clinical consequences followed from this particular encounter. As633
we stress in the analysis, these factors limit the extent to which generalisation to clinical settings or634
other populations is appropriate. Also noteworthy is the significant contrast between some of the635
standard ADOS processes and the general norms of wider healthcare interaction; for example, it636
is not usual in healthcare encounters for the professional to initiate stories about their own637
difficulties. What little evidence there is for the impact of other departures from the interactional638
norm in healthcare suggests that, unsurprisingly, this can cause significant difficulty for both parties639
in assimilating the new interactional ‘rules’. Previous CA work on genetic counselling, for instance,640
shows the difficulties clients experience where a non-directive ethos means that they are expected641
to set their own agendas and understand that practitioners will not make testing recommendations642
for them (Pilnick 2002a, 2002b). From a practitioner perspective, CA work to shed light on the643
unease caused by patients complimenting surgeons in pre-surgery consultations shows that644
compliments offered before treatment recommendations can engender resistance from surgeons645
concerned with patient motivation (Hudak et al 2010). Though these studies are from very646
different contexts, their findings highlight expectations of how healthcare encounters ‘normally’647
work, and the consequences of deviations.648
Despite the above notes of caution, we do feel some generalisable claims are possible. As a CA649
analyst, one has the benefit of repeated detailed viewings of an interaction, and the ability to unpack650
an unfolding interaction sequentially, before arriving at an interpretation. Even with the capacity651
to re-watch diagnostic encounters on video, time pressures ensure that these luxuries are not652
routinely available to ADOS practitioners. Nonetheless, interpretation is crucial given the653
consequences – positive, negative, and uncertain – of a diagnosis of autism. We began by noting654
that it was not our intention to be critical of practitioners, and our analysis has shown the complex655
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interactional judgments that are required of them. It is in this context that we offer the following656
two conclusions.657
First, it is crucial that ADOS practitioners have a firm grounding in how ‘ordinary’ conversation658
works, including an understanding of the everyday forms of resistance which occur in everyday659
talk. To make judgements on what constitutes ‘interactional abnormality’ without a nuanced660
understanding of what constitutes ‘interactional normality’ seems, to us, problematic. Second, our661
analysis highlights that, rather than framing practitioners as ‘stooges’ in the traditional sense,662
reflexive practice for those using the ADOS, or indeed any diagnostic tool where ‘talk is the663
problem’, is essential. We suggest this reflexive practice needs to sit alongside an increased and664
sustained commitment to acknowledging the potential impact of the substrate of interaction-based665
testing upon results. This chimes with Stokoe’s (2013) call to consider the ways in which the666
interactional ‘stakes’ of a manufactured activity may be seen to differ from ‘ordinary’ interaction,667
and the impact this may have on interactional practices. In this specific context, failure to668
acknowledge the need for reflexive practice may have an impact on the security with which an669
autism diagnosis can be viewed, but more pervasively, it may deny individuals undergoing these670
kinds of tests the mundane opportunities for interactional resistance that are ordinarily open to671
others.672
References673
Allen, D. (2013), “Just a Typical Teenager”: The Social Ecology of “Normal Adolescence”—674
Insights from Diabetes Care. Symbolic Interaction, 36: 40–59.675
American Psychiatric Association. (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth676
Edition, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.677
Antaki, C. (2001) D'you like a drink? Dissembling language and the construction of an678
impoverished life, Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 20, 196-213.679
28
Argyle, M. & Dean, J. (1965) Eye-contact, distance and affiliation. Sociometry, 28 (3), 289–304.680
Armstrong, D. (2002) The politics of self-advocacy and people with learning difficulties. Policy and681
Politics, 30(3), 333–345.682
Aspis, S. (1997) Self-advocacy for people with learning difficulties: Does it have a future? Disability683
& Society, 12(4), 647–654.684
Backhaus, P. (2010) Time to get up: Compliance-gaining in a Japanese eldercare facility. Journal of685
Asian Pacific Communication 20(1), 69-89.686
Beckett, A.E. & Campbell, T. (2015) The social model of disability as an oppositional device.687
Disability & Society, 30(2), 270–283.688
Brown, P., (1995) Naming and framing: The social construction of diagnosis and illness. Journal of689
Health and Social Behavior, 34-52.690
Bruinsma, Y., Koegel, R.L., and Koegel, L.K. (2004) Joint attention and children with autism: a691
review of the literature, Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 10, 169 –692
175.693
Buchanan, I. & Walmsley, J., (2006) Self-advocacy in historical perspective. British Journal of Learning694
Disabilities, 34(3), 133–138.695
Callon, M., & Rabeharisoa, V. (2004) Gino’s lesson on humanity: Genetics, mutual entanglements696
and the sociologist’s role. Economy and Society, 33 (1), 1–27.697
Clayman, S. (2002) Sequence and solidarity. In E. J. Lawler & S. R. Thye (Eds.), Advances in group698
processes: Group cohesion, trust and solidarity (pp. 229-253). Oxford: Elsevier Science.699
Curl, T. and Drew, P. (2008) Contingency and Action: A comparison of two forms of requesting,700
Research on Language and Social Interaction, 41(2), 129-153.701
29
Davidson, J. (1984) ‘Subsequent Versions of Invitations, Offers, Requests, and Proposals Dealing702
with Potential or Actual Rejection’, in J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds) Structures of Social Action:703
Studies in Conversation Analysis, pp. 102–28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.704
Fombonne, E. (2009) Epidemiology of pervasive developmental disorders. Pediatric Research, 65(6),705
591–598.706
Foucault, M., (1997) The ethics of the concern of the self as a practice of freedom. In P. Rabinow,707
ed. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. London: Penguin, 281–301.708
Garcia, A.C. (2012) Medical problems where talk is the problem: Current trends in conversation709
analytic research on aphasia, autism spectrum disorder, intellectual disability, and Alzheimer’s.710
Sociology Compass, 6(4), 351–364.711
Gill, V.T. & Maynard, D.W. (1995) On “labeling” in actual interaction: Delivering and receiving712
diagnoses of developmental disabilities. Social Problems, 42(1), 11–37.713
Gill, V.T., Pomerantz, A. & Denvir, P. (2010) Pre-emptive resistance: Patients’ participation in714
diagnostic sense-making activities. Sociology of Health and Illness, 32(1), 1–20.715
Hacking, I., (1995) Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, Princeton, New716
Jersey: Princeton University Press.717
Heinemann, T. (2006) "Will you or can't you? Displaying entitlement in interrogative requests",718
Journal of Pragmatics, 38, 1081-1104.719
Heritage, J. and Sefi, S. (1992) Dilemmas of advice: aspects of the delivery and reception of avice720
in interactions between health visitors and first time mothers. In Drew, P. and Heritage, J. (eds)721
Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.722
Hoffman, E., Myerberg, N.R. & Morawski, J.G. (2015) Acting otherwise: Resistance, agency, and723
subjectivities in Milgram’s studies of obedience. Theory & Psychology, 25(5), 670–689.724
30
Hollin, G. (2014). Constructing a social subject: Autism and human sociality in the 1980s. History725
of the Human Sciences, 27(4), 98-115.726
Hollin, G. (2017). Failing, hacking, passing: Autism, entanglement, and the ethics of727
transformation. BioSocieties, 12(4), pp.611-633.728
Hudak, P.L., Gill, V.T., Aguinaldo, J.P., Clark, S. and Frankel. R. (2010) ‘I’ve heard wonderful729
things about you’: how patients compliment surgeons, Sociology of Health and Illness, 32 (5) 777-730
797.731
Jefferson, G. (1988) On the sequential organization of troubles-talk in ordinary conversation. Social732
Problems, 35(4), 418-441.733
Jones C.D. and Schwartz, I.S. (2009) When asking questions is not enough: An observational study734
of social communication differences in high functioning children with autism. Journal of Autism and735
Developmental Disorders, 39, 432–443.736
Jutel, A. (2009) Sociology of diagnosis: a preliminary review. Sociology of Health & Illness, 31(2), 278–737
99.738
Karnieli-Miller, O. and Eiskivits, Z. (2009) Physician as partner or salesman? Shared decision-739
making in real-time encounters, Social Science & Medicine, 69, 1–8.740
Kasari C. L. et al. (2006) Joint attention and symbolic play in young children with autism: a741
randomized controlled intervention study. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47(6), 611-620.742
Keen, D. (2003) Communication Repair Strategies and Problem Behaviours of Children with743
Autism, International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 50(1), 53-64.744
Keen, D. (2005) The use of non-verbal repair strategies by children with autism. Research in745
Developmental Disabilities, 26, 243-254.746
31
Keen, D., Rodger, S., Doussin, K. & Braithwaite, M. (2007) A pilot study of the effects of a social747
pragmatic intervention on the communication and symbolic play of children with autism. Autism:748
The International Journal of Research and Practice, 11, 63-71.749
Kitzinger, C. and Frith, H. (1999) Just say no? The use of conversation analysis in developing a750
feminist perspective on sexual refusal, Discourse and Society, 10 (3), 293-316.751
Lord, C. et al., (1989) Autism diagnostic observation schedule: a standardized observation of752
communicative and social behavior. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(2), 185–212.753
Lord, C. et al. (2000) The autism diagnostic observation schedule-generic: a standard measure of754
social and communication deficits associated with the spectrum of autism. Journal of Autism and755
Developmental Disorders, 30 (3), 205–23.756
Lord, C., Rutter, M., Dilavore, P. & Risi, S. (2002) Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule. Los757
Angeles, CA: Western Psychological Services758
Maynard, D.W. and Marlaire, C. L. (1992) Good reasons for bad testing performance: The759
interactional substrate of educational testing, Qualitative Sociology, 15, 177-196.760
Maynard, D.W. and Schaeffer, N.C. (2002) Refusal conversion and tailoring. In D.W. Maynard, H.761
Houtkoop-Steenstra and H. van der Zouwen (eds) Standardization and Tacit Knowledge: Interaction and762
Practice in the Survey Interview. New York: Wiley Interscience.763
Milton, D.E.M. (2012) On the ontological status of autism: the “double empathy problem.”764
Disability & Society, 27(6), 883–887.765
Muskett, T. et al., (2010) Inflexibility as an interactional phenomenon: Using conversation analysis766
to re-examine a symptom of autism. Clinical Linguistic and Phonetics, 24(1), 1–16.767
Norbury, C.F. & Sparks, A., (2013) Difference or disorder? Cultural issues in understanding768
neurodevelopmental disorders. Developmental Psychology, 49(1), 45–58.769
32
O’Brien, R., Beeke, S., Pilnick, A., Goldberg, S., Allwood, R. and Harwood, R. (2017) When people770
with dementia say ‘no’: Healthcare professional responses to reluctance and refusal of healthcare771
tasks in the acute hospital setting. Conference Presentation.772
Pillet-Shore, D. (forthcoming) Preference Organization. In Nussbaum, J (ed) The Oxford Research773
Encyclopaedia of Communication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.774
Pilnick, A., (1999) "Patient Counseling" by Pharmacists: Advice, Information, or Instruction? The775
Sociological Quarterly. 40(4): 613-622.776
Pilnick, A., (2002a). What `most people' do: exploring the ethical implications of genetic777
counselling, New Genetics and Society, 21(3): 339-350.778
Pilnick, A., (2002b). `There are no rights and wrongs in these situations': identifying interactional779
difficulties in genetic counselling, Sociology of Health & Illness, 24(1): 66-88780
Pilnick, A., Hindmarsh, J. and Gill, V.T., eds. (2009). Communication in Healthcare Settings: Policy,781
Participation and New Technologies. Oxford: Blackwell.782
Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features of783
preferred/dispreferred turn shapes. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of social action:784
Studies in conversation analysis (pp. 57-101). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.785
Pomerantz, A., & Heritage, J. (2012). Preference. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), The Handbook of786
Conversation Analysis (pp. 210-228). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.787
Rapley, M. (2004) The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge788
University Press.789
Robinson, J.D. (2006) Soliciting Patients’ Presenting Concerns’. In J. Heritage and D.W. Maynard790
(eds) Communication in Medical Care: Interaction Between Primary Care Physicians and Patients. (pp 214-47).791
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.792
33
Sacks, H. (1992) Lectures on Conversation vols I and II. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.793
Sacks, H. (1984) "On doing “being ordinary”", In Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation794
Analysis (J. Maxwell Atkinson, and John Heritage, eds.), Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University795
Press, 413-29.796
Schwartz, I.S.. Sandall, S.R., McBride B.J., Boulware G-L. (2004) Project DATA (Developmentally797
Appropriate Treatment for Autism): An Inclusive School Based Approach to Educating Young798
Children with Autism. Topics in Early Childhood Special Education, 24, 156–168.799
Singh, J.S. (2014) Narratives of participation in autism genetics research. Science, Technology &800
Human Values, 40 (2), 227–249.801
Stivers, T. (2007) Prescribing Under Pressure: Physician-Parent Conversations and Antibiotics. Oxford802
University Press.803
American Psychiatric Association, 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth804
Edition, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.805
Armstrong, D., 2002. The politics of self-advocacy and people with learning difficulties. Policy and806
Politics, 30(3), pp.333–345.807
Aspis, S., 1997. Self-advocacy for people with learning difficulties: Does it have a future?808
Disability & Society, 12(4), pp.647–654.809
Beckett, A.E. & Campbell, T., 2015. The social model of disability as an oppositional device.810
Disability & Society, 30(2), pp.270–283.811
Buchanan, I. & Walmsley, J., 2006. Self-advocacy in historical perspective. British Journal of812
Learning Disabilities, 34(3), pp.133–138.813
Fombonne, E., 2009. Epidemiology of pervasive developmental disorders. Pediatric Research,814
65(6), pp.591–598.815
34
Foucault, M., 1997. The ethics of the concern of the self as a practice of freedom. In P.816
Rabinow, ed. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. London: Penguin, pp. 281–301.817
Garcia, A.C., 2012. Medical problems where talk is the problem: Current trends in conversation818
analytic research on aphasia, autism spectrum disorder, intellectual disability, and819
Alzheimer’s. Sociology Compass, 6(4), pp.351–364.820
Gill, V.T. & Maynard, D.W., 1995. On “labeling” in actual interaction: Delivering and receiving821
diagnoses of developmental disabilities. Social Problems, 42(1), pp.11–37.822
Gill, V.T., Pomerantz, A. & Denvir, P., 2010. Pre-emptive resistance: Patients’ participation in823
diagnostic sense-making activities. Sociology of Health and Illness, 32(1), pp.1–20.824
Hacking, I., 1995. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, Princeton, New825
Jersey: Princeton University Press.826
Hoffman, E., Myerberg, N.R. & Morawski, J.G., 2015. Acting otherwise: Resistance, agency, and827
subjectivities in Milgram’s studies of obedience. Theory & Psychology, 25(5), pp.670–689.828
Hollin, G.J., 2014. Constructing a social subject: Autism and human sociality in the 1980s. History829
of the Human Sciences, 27(4), pp.98–115.830
Lord, C. et al., 1989. Autism diagnostic observation schedule: a standardized observation of831
communicative and social behavior. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(2),832
pp.185–212.833
Lord, C. et al., 2000. The autism diagnostic observation schedule-generic: a standard measure of834
social and communication deficits associated with the spectrum of autism. Journal of Autism835
and Developmental Disorders, 30(3), pp.205–23.836
Muskett, T. et al., 2010. Inflexibility as an interactional phenomenon: Using conversation analysis837
to re-examine a symptom of autism. Clinical Linguistic and Phonetics, 24(1), pp.1–16.838
35
Norbury, C.F. & Sparks, A., 2013. Difference or disorder? Cultural issues in understanding839
neurodevelopmental disorders. Developmental Psychology, 49(1), pp.45–58.840
Singh, J.S., 2014. Narratives of participation in autism genetics research. Science, Technology &841
Human Values, 40(2), pp.227–249.842
Turowetz, J., 2015a. Citing conduct, individualizing symptoms: Accomplishing autism diagnosis843
in clinical case conferences. Social Science and Medicine, 142, pp.214–222.844
Turowetz, J., 2015b. The interactional production of a clinical fact in a case of autism. Qualitative845
Sociology, 38(1), pp.57–78.846
Turowetz, J. & Maynard, D.W., 2016. Category attribution as a device for diagnosis: fitting847
children to the autism spectrum. Sociology of Health & Illness, 38(4), pp.610–626.848
Ten Have, P. (2007) Doing Conversation Analysis 2nd ed., London: Sage Publications.849
Turowetz, J. (2015a) Citing conduct, individualizing symptoms: Accomplishing autism diagnosis850
in clinical case conferences. Social Science and Medicine, 142, 214–222.851
Turowetz, J. (2015b) The interactional production of a clinical fact in a case of autism. Qualitative852
Sociology, 38(1), 57–78.853
Turowetz, J. & Maynard, D.W. (2016) Category attribution as a device for diagnosis: fitting854
children to the autism spectrum. Sociology of Health & Illness, 38 (4), 610–626.855
